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Monetary Policy confronted with the possibility of a double dip
A double dip?
There are various factors affecting one’s conjecture about the future of the
world economy. One is the “objective” content of current evolution as it is
reflected by economic indicators (the second pillar, to speak in the language of
the ECB); another is the increased degree of uncertainty which has followed
September 11.  Unfortunately the macroeconomics of political uncertainty is
not a well developed field in economics.
On the first factor evidence is mixed. All over the world, economists are
currently revising downward their growth forecast for the global economy and
especially for the US, Japan and Europe. The most shared view is that the
“recovery” is and will continue to be softer than expected.
The US economy
In this context the scenario of a double dip in the US is gaining voices as stock
values continue to recede and household moral seems to become hesitant.
 The story goes as follows. The first dip was the consequence of past
overinvestment which led in 2001 to an abrupt and deep decline in investment.
Notice that a recession caused by overinvestment should resemble more the pre
WW2 business cycle, and thus be deeper, than the ones which typically since
WW2 are caused by an acceleration in the inflation rate. It takes time to get rid
of excess capacity, especially because bad loans will lengthen the
convalescence of the private sector. But contrary to what one would have
expected consumption did not follow the path of investment. So the recession
was one of the mildest of US economic history: three quarters of negative
growth in 2001 followed by a strong recovery in the first quarter 2002, at a rate
of about 5% (annual rate). But, the story goes, the robustness of consumption
spending is artificial and will sooner or later fade away. US capitalism has been
put under an oxygen tent, as Shumpeter would have said, through one of the
most expansionary policy mix of US history. One can read in the “Monetary
Policy Report to the Congress” of the FED ( 16 July 2002), “ the federal
reserve had moved aggressively in 2001 to counter the weakness that had
2emerged in aggregate demand”; and indeed from the beginning of 2001 the
interest rate has been cut eleven times, to reach 1,75%. On top of that tax cuts,
investment subsidies, the decrease in the inflation rate, all helped to increase
disposable personal income. Real disposable income increased at an annual
rate of 8% between the fourth quarter of 2001 and May 2002. The budgetary
surplus, which was 207 billions dollars in 2000 turned to a deficit of
approximately the same size (186 billions dollars).
All that served to sustain interest sensitive consumption, and especially
purchase of motor vehicles and residential investment. Low interest rates on
mortgages helped to sustain the robustness of the level of activity in the sector
and home prices which have continued to move up strongly. The consequent
increase in home prices helped to mitigate the effect of the destruction of
several trillions of equity wealth on household net wealth.
But the gulf between the increase of private consumption and the decrease of
private investment cannot continue for ever, and the moment of truth has to
come. As the gulf will not be closed by an increase in businesses investment –
businesses seem unwilling to expand capacity, increase capital equipment
investment or increase headcount – household consumption has to recede. In
fact the sharp decline of the financial market is now damaging the economy as
it leads to a desire of consumers to save – the saving rate has already increase
from 1.5% in 2001 to 3% in 2002 – and limits the willingness of firms to
invest. In addition, borrowing costs have increased sharply for most
companies, and others are credit rationed. If one adds that no new tax cut will
happen before January 2004, and that consumer confidence is falling again, the
case for a double dip seems convincing, the more convincing indeed, if we
consider that the “corporate governance shock” and the prospect of a war with
Iraq cumulate a mounting economic uncertainty with a mounting political
uncertainty.
But the case for a double dip is not so strong when confronted with current
evolution. It is true that the second quarter GDP growth has been a meagre
1.1%, but what we know about the third quarter lead to expect a growth of
about 3.5% and even if GDP growth is expected to be much lower in the forth
quarter, the yearly growth rate for 2OO2 will be about 2.4% at least.
Inventories are now so lean in relation to sales that production has to accelerate
for the next several months. On the other hand, even if growing,
unemployment remains moderate by historical standards. For both reasons the
moderation in the growth of wage and salary disbursement may come to an
end, especially because the productivity acceleration remains important (even
if data revision has lowered productivity growth estimate since 1998). Finally,
the consequence of past overinvestment in NICT has not to be exaggerated in
view of the rapid obsolescence of the goods incorporating these new
technologies.
The euro-area economy
The euro area seems to replicate in an attenuated way the evolution of the US
economy. Here we should not perhaps speak of a double dip but a double
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household consumption exhibit still positive figures, save for the first quarter
2002 where it was modestly negative (-O.2%). The corporate governance
shock has been almost absent, but stock prices have fallen by 50% from their
pick level in 2000. Nevertheless direct equity holdings of households are still
not as widely distributed in the euro area as in the United States. This is why,
according to rough estimations, the marginal propensity to consume out of
equity wealth is much lower in the euro area than in the US (Cf. ECB monthly
bulletin, September 2002). Residential investment seems to resist, and home
prices to be up. But still the prospect for future growth are weak: 1% in 2002;
1.6% for 2003 according to latest estimations. That means that unemployment
will continue to increase, and most probably at a faster pace than in the 12 last
months. The non nil probability of a double dip in the US will almost certainly
obscure the outlook, absent policy reactions in Europe. The US economy is
already no more a centre of external demand addressed to the rest of the world,
and the euro appreciation, mild as it were until now, may become stronger in
the case of a double dip.
The ECB and Macroeconomic Policies
When comparing the US and the euro area economies, one is lead to an
obvious question: why have public policies been so passive in the euro area?
After all the private sector functioned rather well in Europe as compared with
the US, and a modicum of expansionary policy would have done a good job.
The recession in the US and the uncertainty surrounding its growth prospect,
would anyway have called for a revision of economic policy as it changed the
relative weights of internal and external demand. Europe cannot just wait for
the wind to blow and should activate its own wind machine. Since November
2001 – which is the date of the last cut in interest rates by the ECB – the
expectations of growth have been revised downward in a quasi continuous
way. The ECB itself recognise that: “The acceleration of economic activity to
growth rates in line with those of potential growth is now expected in the
course of 2003 rather than by the end of this year. This delay broadly
corresponds with the change in the world economic outlook..” (ECB, Monthly
Bulletin, September 2002, P.5). At the same time the rate of inflation has
decreased from 2.5% in 2001 to a figure of about 2% since the month of may.
How can these changes be without effect on monetary policy? What is
worrying is that in Europe we consider a 2% rate of inflation as dangerously
close to the ECB’s upper limit, whereas in the US such a rate is considered low
and associated with a slack.  It has to be emphasised that core inflation rates are
almost identical in both sides of the Atlantic. Both the ECB and the FED
decided at their last meeting (respectively the 12 and the 24 of September) to
leave their interest rates unchanged (respectively 3.25% and 1.75%), but the
motivation of the decisions where rather different: “the risks to price stability
appear to be rather balanced and ..the current level of interest rates is therefore
appropriate to maintain price stability over the medium run”, says the ECB. On
the contrary, the Federal Open Market committee considers that “the risks are
weighted mainly towards conditions that may generate economic weakness”,
statement which lead to the expectation of a further decline in the interest rates.
4What this makes clear is that whatever rule the ECB is following, it should
have lead to a change in interest rates as the expectations of future inflation and
growth have markedly changed say between January and July 2002. Most
economists think that the cut should have been of 75 basic points, and that a cut
of 25 points would serve no purpose. Hence a move of 50 basis points should
be the minimum than one can expect. With a wait and see approach to
monetary policy and with a fiscal policy conditional to the fate of the rate of
growth – one hears strange statements according to which governments should
delay planned decrease in taxes because growth is lower than expected! – it is
no wonder that internal demand cannot easily rebound.
Table 1 below attempt to measure the slack in demand in both sides of the
Atlantic. The difference between potential and actual growth has been
respectively of .9% in 2001, 1.4% in 2002 and is expected to be of about 1% in
2003. Notice that this difference is expected to be much lower in the US for
2002 and 2003.
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EURO area 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP growth, market prices 4,8% 1,4% -0,9% 2,3% 2,3% 1,4% 2,3% 2,9% 2,7% 3,5% 1,6% 1,0% 1,6%
Potential growth of total economy, volume 5,6% 2,5% 2,0% 1,8% 1,8% 2,0% 2,1% 2,2% 2,2% 2,3% 2,4% 2,4% 2,4%
Excess -1,1% -2,9% 0,5% 0,4% -0,6% 0,2% 0,6% 0,4% 1,2% -0,9% -1,4% -0,8%
Labour force 9,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,5% 0,3% 0,8% 0,9% 1,2% 1,1% 1,2% 0,8% 0,7% 0,9%
Unemployment 7,8% 8,7% 10,3% 11,0% 10,7% 10,9% 11,0% 10,3% 9,5% 8,5% 8,0% 8,2% 8,1%
USA 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP growth product, market prices -0,5% 3,1% 2,7% 4,0% 2,7% 3,6% 4,4% 4,3% 4,1% 4,1% 1,2% 2,5% 2,8%
Potential growth of total economy, volume 2,6% 2,4% 2,7% 2,7% 2,9% 3,2% 3,7% 3,7% 3,8% 3,7% 3,4% 3,0% 3,1%
Excess 0,7% 0,0% 1,3% -0,2% 0,4% 0,8% 0,6% 0,3% 0,4% -2,2% -0,5% -0,3%
Labour force 0,4% 1,4% 0,8% 1,4% 1,0% 1,2% 1,8% 1,0% 1,2% 1,1% 0,7% 0,4% 1,1%
Unemployment 6,8% 7,5% 6,9% 6,1% 5,6% 5,4% 4,9% 4,5% 4,2% 4,0% 4,8% 5,6% 5,3%
6Attempts at measuring the output gap are more complex, as the measure depends of
the year taken as a reference. Table 2 try to give some insights, in selecting various
reference years. It clearly appears that whatever the reference year, the output gap in
Europe is sizeable, contrary to the US. It has to be emphasised that both tables give
very conservative estimates of the output gap, as the data used are from OECD,
which has lower estimates of potential growth than most others institutes.
7Table 2. Output gaps, Euro area and US
Potential productivity 2,5% 2,1% 1,4% 1,6% 1,2% 1,2% 1,0% 1,1% 1,1% 1,6% 1,7% 1,4%
Output gap 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
100,0 98,9 96,0 96,5 96,9 96,3 96,5 97,2 97,6 98,7 97,9 96,5 95,8 1991
100,0 97,1 97,6 98,0 97,4 97,6 98,2 98,7 99,8 99,0 97,6 96,8 1992
100,0 100,5 100,9 100,3 100,5 101,2 101,6 102,8 101,9 100,5 99,7 1993
100,0 100,4 99,8 100,0 100,7 101,1 102,3 101,4 100,0 99,2 1994
100,0 99,4 99,6 100,3 100,7 101,9 101,0 99,6 98,8 1995
100,0 100,2 100,9 101,3 102,5 101,6 100,2 99,4 1996
100,0 100,6 101,1 102,3 101,4 99,9 99,2 1997
100,0 100,4 101,6 100,7 99,3 98,6 1998
100,0 100,4 101,6 100,7 99,3 98,6 1999
100,0 101,2 100,3 98,9 98,1 2000
100,0 99,1 97,7 97,0 2001
Potential productivity 1,0% 1,8% 1,3% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,7% 2,6% 2,0%
Output gap 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
100,0 100,7 100,7 102,0 101,7 102,1 102,9 103,6 103,9 104,3 102,0 101,5 101,2 1991
100,0 100,0 101,3 101,1 101,5 102,3 102,9 103,2 103,6 101,3 100,9 100,5 1992
100,0 101,3 101,1 101,5 102,3 102,9 103,2 103,6 101,3 100,9 100,5 1993
100,0 99,8 100,2 100,9 101,6 101,9 102,3 100,0 99,6 99,2 1994
100,0 100,4 101,2 101,8 102,1 102,5 100,2 99,8 99,4 1995
100,0 100,8 101,4 101,7 102,1 99,9 99,4 99,0 1996
100,0 100,6 100,9 101,3 99,1 98,6 98,3 1997
100,0 100,3 100,7 98,5 98,0 97,7 1998
100,0 100,3 100,7 98,5 98,0 97,7 1999
100,0 100,4 98,2 97,7 97,4 2000
100,0 97,8 97,3 97,0 2001
8 On the other hand, the graph below shows that the rate of capacity utilisation is
much higher in Europe than in the US (overinvestment was much less of a reality in
the euro area). But it is clear that both rates have decreased, and that in Europe the
degree of slack in the economy could be usefully combated by a more aggressive
monetary policy.
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